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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DUE PROCESS—THE PROPERTY INTEREST IN 
A TENURED PROFESSORSHIP WITH A STATE UNIVERSITY IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PROTECTION—Nicholas v. 
Pennsylvania State University., No. 98-7611, 2000 WL 1285698 (3d Cir. 
Sept. 13, 2000). 
In 1966, the Noll Human Performance Laboratory at Pennsylvania 
State University appointed Dr. W. Channing Nicholas to the position of 
associate professor of physiology, and granted him tenure seven years later.  
Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State University , No. 98-7611, 2000 WL 
1285698, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept. 13, 2000).  To supplement his income from 
the University, Nicholas worked as an emergency room physician, and, as a 
result, did not work regular hours at Noll Lab.  Nicholas’ employment 
situation became an issue in 1993 when Dr. William Evans, the new 
director of Noll Lab, asked Nicholas to supply a written schedule for his 
work at the lab, an outline of his research plans, and an assurance that he 
would maintain a full-time schedule.  Nicholas refused to provide the 
information or the assurance.  Evans issued a series of warnings to 
Nicholas, culminating in two meetings in 1994 at which Nicholas was told 
that he would be terminated if he did not comply with Evans’ requests.  
Again Nicholas refused, and on June 17, 1994, Evans fired him. 
Nicholas appealed the termination, believing it to be the result of 
personal animosity against him on the part of Evans, whom Nicholas had 
reported to the State Board of Medicine earlier in the year for his plan to 
use non-medical personnel to perform certain lab functions.  Id. at *1-*2.  
At the hearing, Nicholas was represented by counsel and was given the 
opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses.  Id. at *2.  Nevertheless, 
the University’s Committee on Tenure found Evans’ charges constituted 
adequate cause for termination and upheld the dismissal.  After leaving the 
University, Nicholas found full-time employment as a doctor and earned 
substantially more than he had as a professor. 
In June, 1997, Nicholas filed a lawsuit against Pennsylvania State 
University and Evans, alleging that the defendants violated (1) his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and under the First 
Amendment, (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on violations of his substantive 
due process right, freedom of expression right, and age discrimination, (3) 
the Pennsylvania whistleblower law, (4) his tenure contract, and (5) 
ERISA.  Id.  The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
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granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the first count, 
the fifth count, and the § 1983 substantive due process and age 
discrimination claims.  Id.  At the close of Nicholas’ case, the district court 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the third count.  Id.  As to the 
remaining § 1983 First Amendment and breach of contract claims, the jury 
returned a special verdict that found: (1) the defendants provided Nicholas 
with notice of the charges leveled against him and a chance to respond; (2) 
the defendants failed to provide Nicholas with a fair hearing; (3) Nicholas’ 
report to the State Board of Medicine regarding Evans was a motivating 
factor in his dismissal; (4) the University would have terminated Nicholas 
even if the report had not been filed; and (5) the University breached its 
tenure contract with Nicholas.  Id.  The district court granted defendants’ 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to Question 2, and 
entered judgment for the University on Nicholas’ First Amendment claim, 
for Evans on all claims, and for Nicholas on the breach of contract claim 
against the University.  Id.  During trial, the district court granted discovery 
sanctions against Nicholas, excluding evidence regarding future lost 
earnings, punitive and compensatory damages, and detrimental reliance.  
Id. at *3.  The jury awarded Nicholas nominal damages of $1,000.00, 
which the court reduced to $1.00.  Id.  The court further ordered that 
Nicholas receive one year’s severance pay, but declined to order the 
University to give Nicholas his job back.  Id. 
Nicholas appealed, making five substantive arguments.  Id.  Nicholas 
disputed (1) the district court’s dismissal of his substantive due process 
claim (the primary issue on appeal), (2) the court’s judgment for the 
University on his First Amendment claim, (3) the jury verdict on his 
procedural due process claim, (4) the court’s judgment for Evans on all 
claims, and (5) the jury charge on the breach of contract claim.  Id.  
Nicholas also made three arguments relating to damages, disputing (1) the 
reduction of the damage award, (2) the denial of specific performance, and 
(3) the limitation of his damages to lost compensation only.  Id.  Finally, 
Nicholas raised three evidentiary points, arguing that the court erred in (1) 
limiting his time for cross-examination of Evans, (2) excluding character 
testimony about Evans, and (3) granting the defendants’ motion for 
discovery sanctions against him.  Id. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a unanimous opinion, 
affirmed the holdings of the district court.  Id.  In particular, the court held 
that the property interest in a tenured position does not rise to the level of a 
“fundamental” interest, and thus is not entitled to substantive due process 
protection.  Id. at *1.  The court also held that the termination was not a 
retaliatory discharge in violation of the First Amendment, that the district 
court did not err in reducing Nicholas’ nominal damage award to $1 and in 
MOSER SURVEY FORMATTED.DOC  2/7/2001  11:45 AM 
302 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:300 
limiting damages to those of a compensatory nature, and that the district 
court properly granted discovery sanctions against Nicholas.  Id. at *9-*14. 
Judge Alito, writing for the court, began with an analysis of the 
principal issue on appeal: Nicholas’s assertions that his tenured 
professorship was a property right protected by the substantive component 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that his 
termination was arbitrary, irrational, and improper and therefore 
unconstitutional.  Id. at *3.  Judge Alito initially noted that the United 
States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause contains both a 
procedural element and a substantive element.  Id. at *4.  The procedural 
element, the judge explained, guarantees fairness in state procedures.  Id.  
The substantive factor, the judge continued, consists of two conceptually 
distinct strains.  Id.  First, the judge explained that a plaintiff may challenge 
the constitutionality of a legislative act, the benchmark of which is whether 
the government can identify “a legitimate state interest that the legislature 
could rationally conclude was served by the statute.”  Id.  Second, the judge 
further expounded that a plaintiff may challenge a non-legislative state 
action—even where the state satisfied its procedural due process 
obligation—with an allegation that the deprivation was “arbitrary, 
irrational, or tainted by improper motive.”  Id. (citations omitted).  In this 
second situation, the court stated, the plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, 
show that he has a protected property interest.  Id. 
Judge Alito observed that the Third Circuit held in DeBlasio v. Zoning 
Board of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 1995), that a property interest 
must bear a “particular quality” to merit substantive due process protection.  
Id. at *5.  Judge Alito noted that, although little judicial guidance exists to 
suggest what such a “particular quality” is, the United States Supreme 
Court has indicated that the “particular quality” should be determined not 
by reference to state law, but by an analysis of whether the property interest 
is “fundamental” under the United States Constitution.  Id. (citing Regents 
of Univiversity of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985)).  Judge 
Alito adopted the approach of Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in 
Ewing, which focused on the nature of the property interest and expressed 
the view that a “fundamental” interest is “closely tied to ‘the respect for the 
teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our 
society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of 
federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and 
preserving American freedoms.’”  Id. at *6 (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 
229-30 (Powell, J., concurring)). The court avowed that in this regard, 
some property interests are clearly protected by substantive due process—
land ownership is the classic example in the Third Circuit.  Id.  Judge Alito 
distinguished state-created property rights, however, which, while without 
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question are entitled to procedural due process protection, must be 
scrutinized with “the utmost care” in the determination of entitlement to 
substantive due process protection, particularly where no precedent exists.  
Id. (citations omitted).  The court listed four cases in which the Third 
Circuit held that deprivation of the property right at issue did not raise a 
substantive due process claim: Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 
1989), concerning a service contract with the state; Ransom v. Marrazzo, 
848 F.2d 398 (3d. Cir. 1988), litigating a state-law entitlement to utility 
services; Mauriello v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 
781 F.2d 46 (3d. Cir. 1986), analyzing a student’s interest in continuing 
school enrollment; and Independent Enterprises Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & 
Sewer Authority, 103 F.3d 1156 (3d Cir. 1997), in which the Third Circuit 
held that a low bidder’s entitlement to a state contract was not a property 
interest implicitly protected by the Constitution.  Id. at *6-*7.  Judge Alito 
concluded that where a plaintiff challenges a non-legislative deprivation of 
a property interest, and that interest is not fundamental in nature, insofar as 
the government complies with the procedural due process requirements of 
adequacy and fairness, the plaintiff cannot state a claim for a violation of 
substantive due process.  Id. at *7. 
Having established this framework, Judge Alito turned to the 
particulars of Nicholas’ case.  Id. at *8.  The judge initially pointed out that 
the majority of courts of appeals have held that a tenured position with a 
state university is a state-created contract right that does not rise to the level 
of a fundamental property interest, and therefore does not warrant 
substantive due process protection.  Id.  The court announced that the Third 
Circuit would join their ranks: A tenured professorship, it reasoned, is 
neither “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions,” nor is 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty like personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family.”  Id.  The court stated that a tenured professorship 
more closely resembles those interests, like a service contract with the 
state, which the Third Circuit previously ruled did not merit substantive 
due process protection.  Id. (citations omitted).  In so holding, Judge Alito 
commented that the court’s conclusion would do no violence to the caution 
of the United States Supreme Court that the federal courts not become the 
venue through which state employees might air their grievances with their 
employers, for “the United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed 
to require federal judiciary review for every such [personnel decision in] 
error.”  Id. at *8-*9 (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 359-60 
(1976)). 
The court then shifted its attention to Nicholas’ second substantive 
argument: That his discharge was in retaliation for his statements about 
Evans to the State Board of Medicine, and therefore violated the First 
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Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression.  Id. at *9.  Judge Alito 
explained that the appropriate analysis for a § 1983 retaliation claim is set 
forth in Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle , 429 U.S. 274 (1977); 
a plaintiff must first show that his constitutionally protected speech was a 
substantial or motivating factor in his termination, at which point the 
burden shifts to the defendant who, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
must establish that the plaintiff’s discharge would have occurred even in 
the absence of protected speech.  Id. (citations omitted).  In this case, the 
judge concluded, the jury found that Nicholas had satisfied his burden to 
show that his report to the Board of Medicine was a substantial factor in his 
discharge, but also found that the University would have fired Nicholas 
regardless of his comments.  Id. at *10.  Therefore, the court held, the 
University successfully established its Mount Healthy affirmative defense, 
and the judgment against Nicholas was appropriate.  Id.  The court rejected 
Nicholas’ contention that because the jury found that the University was in 
breach of contract, it should also have inferred that the discharge was 
wrongful.  Id.  The jury, the court explained, may simply have found that 
the University was in breach of the tenure contract because the reasons for 
Nicholas’ termination did not constitute adequate cause—not because they 
were unconstitutional.  Id.  Judge Alito also rejected Nicholas’ argument 
that the district court should have submitted an instruction on pretext, 
according to the standard of the Title VII “dual motive” cases.  Id.  The 
judge pointed out that under Mount Healthy, Title VII analysis is 
inapplicable in the First Amendment context.  Id. 
The court summarily disposed of Nicholas’ remaining three 
substantive issues on appeal.  Id.  Nicholas’ assertion that the evidence did 
not support the jury verdict against him on his procedural due process 
claim was of no consequence, the court held, because Nicholas never made 
a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Id.  Likewise, the 
court disagreed with Nicholas’ challenge to the judgment for Evans on the 
breach of contract claim.  Id. at *11.  Nicholas did not even allege he had a 
contract with Evans, the court observed.  Id.  Finally, the court rejected 
Nicholas’ objections to the jury instructions for the breach of contract 
claim: the charge correctly stated Pennsylvania law, the court held, and 
even if it was in error, the error would have been harmless, because the jury 
found for Nicholas on this particular claim.  Id. 
At this point in its opinion, the court concentrated on Nicholas’ three 
arguments concerning the lower court’s treatment of damages.  Id.  Judge 
Alito reasoned that Nicholas’ first contention—that the district court erred 
in reducing the damages for the breach of contract claim from $1,000.00 to 
$1.00—was without merit, because in both Pennsylvania and the Third 
Circuit, the standard award of nominal damages is $1.00, or the basic unit 
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of American currency.  Id. at *12.  The court likewise held against 
Nicholas’ second assertion that the district erred in declining to order the 
University to reinstate him.  Id.  The judge confirmed that under 
Pennsylvania law, and according to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
specific performance is an inappropriate remedy for the breach of a 
contract for personal services.  Id.  Because the University’s liability was 
solely contractual, the court concluded that an order for reinstatement 
would have been improper.  Id.  Nicholas’ third argument, the court noted, 
urged that the lower court erred in excluding his evidence concerning 
punitive damages and compensatory damages arising from mental 
depression.  Id.  The court once again referred to Pennsylvania law and 
found that (1) punitive damages are not recoverable for a claim based on 
breach of contract alone; and (2) compensatory damages for emotional 
distress are only recoverable if the plaintiff alleges physical injury.  Id. at 
*12-*13 (citations omitted).  Because Nicholas did not allege physical 
injury, the court held that the district court did not err in precluding 
Nicholas from introducing evidence of punitive and compensatory 
damages.  Id. at *12. 
Finally, the court reviewed Nicholas’ three evidentiary objections.  Id. 
at *13.  First, the court noted, Nicholas contended that the lower court 
improperly restricted his time to cross-examine Evans.  Id.  At the 
beginning of the trial, Judge Alito explained, both parties agreed to limit 
the time used for questioning witnesses to move the case along quickly.  Id.  
Judge Alito observed that Nicholas waived his right to appeal the time 
limitation because he never objected to it at trial—in fact, Nicholas 
consented to it; therefore, the court held, the lower court’s ruling would 
stand.  Id. 
Second, Judge Alito continued, Nicholas protested the district court’s 
exclusion of the testimony of one of Nicholas’ witnesses concerning 
Evans’ truthfulness.  Id.  Judge Alito, indicating the lower court’s ruling 
would be reviewed only for abuse of discretion, pointed to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 608(b), which states that “specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not 
be proved by extrinsic evidence [evidence offered through other 
witnesses.]”  Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)).  The Third Circuit has 
construed Rule 608, Judge Alito clarified, as requiring the exclusion of 
extrinsic evidence concerning a witness’s prior conduct; a party, then, must 
rely on his right to cross-examine to bring the witness’s credibility into 
question.  Id. (quoting United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 
1989)).  Therefore, the court declined to overrule the district court’s 
decision to exclude Nicholas’s witness’s testimony.  Id. 
Finally, Judge Alito addressed Nicholas’ last argument on appeal: 
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That the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for 
discovery sanctions against Nicholas and in precluding the introduction of 
evidence concerning lost future earnings.  Id.  The lower court, Judge Alito 
explained, had sanctioned Nicholas for his failure to promptly reveal that 
the institution at which he worked part-time as an emergency room doctor 
had notified him that his position would be eliminated; this rendered 
information previously disclosed about his current employment materially 
inaccurate.  Id.  Remarking that its review was for abuse of discretion, the 
court cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), upon which the lower 
court had relied, which provides that a party has a duty to supplement or 
correct material information previously furnished, but no longer complete 
or correct.  Id. at *14.  Moreover, Judge Alito continued, under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), exclusion of that evidence may be proper 
as a sanction against the non-disclosing party, based on a consideration of 
four factors: (1) the surprise or prejudice of the party against whom the 
evidence would be introduced; (2) the capacity of the prejudiced party to 
cure; (3) the extent to which inclusion of the non-disclosed evidence would 
disrupt the trial; and (4) the bad faith of the non-disclosing party.  Id.  In 
this case, the judge agreed with the lower court that Nicholas’ non-
disclosure did prejudice the defendants, who would have to gather 
additional evidence and create a new rebuttal argument to Nicholas’ claim 
of lost future earnings, and would delay the trial, as the defendants would 
need more time to prepare.  Id.  Therefore, the court found the exclusion of 
this evidence was an appropriate sanction, and affirmed the ruling of the 
lower court.  Id. 
The Third Circuit addressed myriad issues in this case, affirming, 
across the board, the district court’s evidentiary and damages rulings and 
substantive holdings.  Clearly, however, the substantive due process 
question was the most interesting and significant in the case.  In holding 
that a tenured position is not a fundamental property interest and is 
therefore not entitled to substantive due process protection, the Third 
Circuit has finally weighed in on a problem that is currently the subject of a 
circuit split. 
The court’s conclusion followed logically from Supreme Court and 
Third Circuit jurisprudence: A tenured professorship is more like a state-
created property interest (not entitled to substantive due process 
protection), and is less like a fundamental property interest (like land 
ownership—entitled to substantive due process protection).  Certainly 
tenure is an important and valuable concept: the security it provides 
guarantees a greater academic freedom and serves as an incentive to bring 
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bright, qualified individuals into the teaching profession.  But tenure is, at 
its core, a job contract, protected, like other contracts, by state law and 
subject to procedural due process standards.  It does not rise to the level of 
a constitutionally protected interest. 
Maria M. Moser 
 
